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Abstract:
This paper examines the effects of introducing the electronic trading system (EBS)
on the foreign exchange market, the biggest financial market in the world where trading
occurs through many dealers. We find that increasing transparency leads to an increase in
informational efficiency, an important aspect of market quality. However, informed
dealers are found to quote less aggressively in the more transparent market. Overall, we
conclude that semi-transparency raises market efficiency in general, but that it is the
uninformed dealers who benefit more from this increased efficiency.
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1. Introduction
The foreign exchange market is the largest financial market in the world with a
daily turnover of $US 3.2 trillion.1 It is a typical dealership market where dealers around
the world compete with each other for customers. For inter-dealer trading, the dealers
also trade with each other in order to share the risk of holding unbalanced currency
inventories, and to speculate. This market’s institutional arrangement differs from that of
a centralized auction market (such as the New York Stock Exchange), where individuals
known as specialists make the market and coordinate the trading process.
Transparency is a key aspect of any financial market. The main idea of market
microstructure studies is that information aggregation in the market leads to price
discovery. For the foreign exchange market, full transparency includes revealing the limit
order book and best offer price pre-trade, and transaction price and quantity post-trade.
Traditionally, the foreign exchange market has relied on bilateral phone-based trading
platform, in which access to the market information is very limited. Two main electronic
systems, the Reuters System and the Electronic Brokering System, were introduced in
04/1992 and 10/1993 respectively. The new systems reveal only the offer price before
trade and transaction price after trade, and account for most of the transactions in the
market. In this sense, the new electronic trading systems transformed the foreign
exchange market from almost opaque to semi-transparent. As the EBS is the primary
liquidity source for EUR/USD (DEM/USD before 1999), the effect of EBS on the market
should be more significant than that of Reuters, which has been confirmed by Ding and
Hiltrop (2009). Thus, this paper only focuses on the EBS, and would consider only
10/1993 as when the electronic system was introduced.
1

BIS triennial survey, 2008.
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Dealers, the players of the market, are usually classified as big (informed) dealers
and small (uninformed) dealers. Big dealers, such as big banks, possess relative
information advantage because of their market power and connections with insiders.
Small dealers, who could even be individuals, obviously lack the same information
sources. Intuitively, in a completely transparent market, informed dealers would hesitate
to trade. This is because dealers reveal their known information while trading, and big
dealers do not want to lose their information advantage. On the other hand, in a
completely opaque market, uninformed dealers will be taken advantage of and are thus
unwilling to trade as well. Both extremes impede market liquidity and result in less
trading activities. A trade-off exists between transparency and market quality, and some
semi-transparency level should be the optimal. By examining the impact of the electronic
trading systems on the foreign exchange market, we will be able to ascertain whether the
change from opacity to semi-transparency has indeed increased market efficiency. No
research to date has done such an empirical test, thus our paper contributes to the
literature by providing the first investigation on a semi-transparency event on a dealership
market.
We find that the information efficiency increased after the system was introduced,
by testing through first-order return autocorrelation. We also determine the impact on the
big and small dealer groups by measuring the relative contributions of each dealer group
to the price discovery process, and find that big dealers quoted relatively less
aggressively after the system was introduced. Overall, we conclude that the semitransparency raises market efficiency in general, but that it is the uninformed dealers who
benefit more from this increased efficiency.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief
survey of the literature; Section 3 introduces in detail the data we use in the study;
Section 4 tests the first and second hypotheses above, analyzes the results and performs
additional robustness tests; Section 5 concludes.

2. Literature Review
Theoretical studies on the dealership market lean towards semi-transparency.
Biais (1993) predicts that pre-trade transparency increases both market efficiency and
liquidity. Lyons (1996) suggests that the disclosure of order flow will make informed
dealers lose their information advantage, thus these dealers would hesitate to trade, which
decreases market liquidity. He argues that semi-transparency should be optimal for
market liquidity. Naik, Nueberger and Viswanathan (1999) provide another trade-off
between transparency and market liquidity. They show that greater transparency can
reduce inventory holding costs, but increase price revision risk. The nondisclosure of the
first-stage trade details allows the market maker who receives the order first to profit
from the learned information.
Existing empirical results are mixed, partly because most of these studies focus on
full transparency markets. In the NASDAQ, Harris and Schultz (1997) find that in the
anonymous Small Order Execution System, market makers show wider bid-ask spreads
compared with the regular non-anonymous dealer markets. Such a finding suggests that
increasing identity transparency increases market liquidity. Chung and Chuwonganant
(2009) examine how the introduction of SuperMontage, which increases pre-trade trade
transparency by displaying the limit order book, affects the NASDAQ. They find the
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transparency change improves market and execution quality. In bonds market, which is
another dealership market, Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2006) find
significant reductions in institutional execution costs after the initiation of the Trade
Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) reporting system which increases post-trade
transparency. Hendershott and Jones (2005) study a change to a less transparent trading
system at Island, an Electronic Communications Network (ECN). After stopping
displaying its limit order book in its most liquid products to all market participants, the
Island is found to have higher trading costs and loses market share. In contrast, Goldstein,
Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007) show that except for very large trades, spreads on bonds
whose prices become more transparent decline relative to bonds that experience no
change in transparency.
Many other studies focus on auction market. The results are inconclusive. For
example, Boehmer, Saar, and Yu (2005) examine the effect of increasing pre-trade
transparency by introducing OpenBook service on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), which reveals limit order book in the market and hence increases pre-trade order
transparency. They show that greater pre-trade transparency led to higher liquidity and
greater informational efficiency of price. In contrast, Gemmill (1996) finds no evidence
of liquidity change when the London Stock Exchange reduces post-trade transparency by
delaying the publication of prices for block trades. The previous discussion on the
difference between auction and dealership markets—mainly, the absolute information
advantage of specialists, and smaller degree of competition for information in auction
market, versus the decentralized nature and greater competition for information found in
dealership market—would shed light on the different results obtained in the auction
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market. It is also for this reason that we base our predictions along those of dealership
market studies.
The literature surveyed above paints the general picture of a trade-off between
transparency and market quality in the foreign exchange market. Specifically, the
advantage of full and prompt information disclosure is to lower the costs of trading for
uninformed dealers. The main disadvantage is that informed market participants would
hesitate to trade, so that market liquidity is hurt. I will contribute to the literature by
conducting the first empirical study on semi-transparency in a dealership market. The
event we study is the introduction of the electronic trading systems that changed the
foreign exchange market from almost opaque to semi-transparent. The lack of semitransparency study on dealership market distinguishes our work from the rest.
Furthermore, most of the existing studies do not investigate how different market
participants are impacted by the change in market transparency. As we saw earlier,
related studies present somewhat mixed results on the impact of semi-transparency, and
suggest that greater transparency benefits uninformed dealers at the expense of informed
dealers. We therefore propose the following two null hypotheses:
1. Semi-transparency (pre-trade quote transparency and post-trade price transparency)
does not affect market efficiency.
2. The impact of semi-transparency is the same for informed dealers and uninformed
dealers.

3. Data and Summary Statistics
The ideal data for our tests should contain real transaction data that cover periods

7

before and after the system was introduced. However, the electronic transaction data
currently available, such as the popular ones from the Electronic Brokering System used
in many recent studies, do not have dealer identifiers with each transaction, so that the
impact on different dealers cannot be tested (that is, we would not be able to test
Hypothesis 2). Another restriction is that real transaction data before 1992 are difficult to
obtain. Therefore, we use indicative data provided by Olsen Financial. Several studies,
such as Goodhart et. al. (1996) as well as Chen and Phylaktis (2009), show that the real
data and indicative data are almost identical, so we are assured that using indicative data
will not fundamentally affect the reliability of our results. Lastly, neither indicative nor
real data have transaction volumes. We follow the convention of previous studies, such as
Kaul and Sapp (2009), to use quoting frequency as a proxy for transaction volume.
Goodhart et al. (1996), Chen and Phylaktis (2009), and Danielsson and Payne (2002) also
show that indicative quotes frequency and real frequency are highly consistent.
Our data cover all months between 10/1992 – 04/1994. They can be divided into
quote data and news data. For each month, the quote data consist of tick-by-tick spot
quotes for the Deutsche Mark-U.S. Dollar exchange rate. The bid and ask prices, the date,
and the time rounded to the nearest second are also provided for each quote. In addition,
each quote has a unique Reuters identifier which specifies the quoting dealer and their
location. Before 10/1993, the identifiers are numbers. For instance, code 0043 refers to
the CitiBank in New York City. After 10/1993, the identifiers are 4-letter codes. For
instance, CITN is the code for the CitiBank in New York City. We use this information to
identify the most active participants in the market. Table 5 shows the top 10 dealers
ranked on quote frequency throughout our sample period. Following other studies such as
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Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993), we exclude weekends and holidays, because of their
low and inconsistent trading activity. We define weekends as extending from 20:00 GMT
Friday evening (the close of North American markets) until 23:59 GMT Sunday evening
(when trading commences in the Far East).
There are numerous data points for each month. Table 1 reports descriptive
statistics for quote frequency at 5-minute intervals and raw data of all midquotes. Figure
1 displays daily average midquotes (the average of bid and ask prices), midquote variance,
and quote frequency for big and small dealers separately2. Note that because there are a
number of missing observations in 10/1993, the data do display some discontinuity for
that month. The midquotes of big and small dealers, as shown on the first panel of the
figure, show almost no difference. This provides a good grounding in our information
share estimation in Section 4.2, where we assume that big and small dealers’ quotes
should not differ substantially. The variance plot shows that big dealers’ variance is
slightly smaller than small dealers. Also, we can see from the figure that variance
decreases, whereas quote frequency increases, after the EBS was introduced. Midquote
variances and quote frequencies correspond to market volatility and trading volume,
respectively, which are two important aspects of market quality. Although we will not
conduct specific tests, the decrease in midquote variances and the increase in quote
frequency suggest an improved market quality following the introduction of the system.
To test news effect in the different trading systems, we also obtained news data
extracted from Reuters AAMM headline news during the same period. Each news
observation includes the date, the time rounded to the nearest second, and a brief sentence

2

Here, big dealers are defined as top 5 dealers based on their monthly quoting frequencies. In subsequent sections this
definition will be changed.
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of the news content. According to Almeida et al (1998) and Anderson et al (2007),
various macroeconomic news announcements are found to have significant impact on
dealers’ quotes. We use a classification similar to theirs and include all news regarding
interest rate, inflation rate, unemployment rate, income, spending, retail sales,
consumption, GDP, durable goods consumption, payroll, industrial production, CPI and
PPI as significant news. Table 3 shows the frequency of the major news in each month,
and Figure 2 displays the daily frequency of news (all news) arrivals throughout the
period. Both the table and figure show that news frequency increases significantly since
late 1993, probably due to the stock market downturn caused by the Peso crisis and
tightening monetary policy in the US market during the period.

4. Analysis
4.1 Information Efficiency Test
The basic theory underlying the first hypothesis is the efficient-market hypothesis,
which asserts that financial markets are “informationally efficient.” This means that
prices of traded securities reflect all available information. The foreign exchange market
is the largest financial market in the world in terms of transaction volumes, and the traded
security is the currency, with the price being the quotes submitted by different dealers at
different points in time. Because information is the key in ensuring that the market is
efficient, it is natural to expect that the more easily information is transmitted among
market participants, the higher the efficiency is.
An efficient market is characterized by a random walk model, applied to the
security prices. A random walk model basically says future security prices could not be
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determined by past prices. Thus, written in algebraic form, it is:

,

Because

where

represents the price series

is nonstationary, we cannot run model on

run first differences of

,

using the original form. So we

and its lagged values, then the above equation becomes:

where the coefficient for

would be zero. In other words, if the

market follows a random walk, then current security returns do not predict future returns.
Therefore, the key to comparing the market efficiency before and after the system is to
compare the coefficients before and after the system, and see which one is closer to zero
(and thus follows a random walk model).
As suggested by Kaul and Sapp (2009), if a financial market is efficient, then
security returns follows a random walk and its first-order autocorrelation should be zero.
Accordingly, if the information incorporation is more efficient in the semi-transparent
trading system, autocorrelation coefficient of exchange rate returns should be closer to
zero. We use the following specification to test the hypothesis:

The subscripts t and t-1 signify that it is a time series process. We pick quotes from our
raw data set so that they are five minutes apart from each other, and use the resulting
quotes as our series. In the first equation above,

is spot exchange rate change, defined
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as the first order difference of logarithm spot rate. EBS and F are system dummy and
quote frequency respectively, so
interval.

is the number of quotes in the t-th 5-minute

is a classical error item with variance of

. The second equation is a GARCH

(1,1) process to account for the time-varying second moment of exchange rate return.
Unlike a typical GARCH (1,1) specification, we incorporate the lagged value of F
because in our framework, quote frequency also has an impact on the variance of
exchange rate return.
There are four coefficients in the first equation. Coefficient

measures the

autocorrelation coefficient before the system was introduced. The system dummy EBS is
included to compare the autocorrelations before and after the electronic system, and
coefficient

reflects such a difference. Autocorrelation of exchange rate return

intuitively reflects over or under reaction of the exchange rate change to news. Increasing
trading activity usually implies overreaction in the market. We use quote frequency to
interact with the lagged returns to reflect this effect. Similar to general autocorrelation
part, we also include a system dummy to examine the difference between the effects
before and after the new system.
The results are reported in Panel A of Table 2. According to the table, the
constant term is not statistically different from zero, which is consistent with the
requirement of the random walk model. The coefficient

is significantly negative,

suggesting price reversal, a typical pattern for high frequency financial data. The
coefficient of cross-product of system dummy and lagged return

is found to be

significantly positive, which implies that the semi-transparent system reduces exchange
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rate return autocorrelation and brings it closer to zero. In other words, information
efficiency is higher in the new system. The significantly positive
in the market when trading is more active. The negative

implies over-reaction
suggests that this over-

reaction decreases in the new trading system. Overall we can see that after the system
was introduced, the autocorrelation for returns becomes closer to zero. This agrees with
our expectation that the information efficiency increases when the new system facilitates
easier information dissemination.

4.2 Price Discovery Efficiency
Flood et al. (1999) argue that due to higher search costs, informed dealers quote
more aggressively in opaque market and quote transparency causes slower price
discovery. Madhavan (1995) also suggests that participation of informed dealers might be
deterred in a more transparent market because greater transparency reduces the effective
amount of noise in the market, lowering market liquidity and making prices more
sensitive to undisclosed liquidity trades. In Section 4.1, we show that semi-transparency
increases price efficiency in the sense that it reduces under or over-reaction to the market
news. However, it does not provide any insights into the concern about whether informed
dealers might deter their quoting so that some private information might not be released
as quickly as in the opaque market, causing slower information incorporation.
According to the research mentioned above, big dealers who possess information
advantage should quote more aggressively in the opaque market. Such aggressiveness can
be measured by dealers’ contribution to the efficient price. We use the concept of
information share, introduced by Hasbrouck (1995), to measure each group of dealers’
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relative contribution.
Despite the fact that different dealers give different quotes, their quotes should be
very close to each other, otherwise arbitrage behavior would eliminate any significant
differences among the quotes. In this sense, dealer quotes are cointegrated. Price quotes
of big dealers (

) and small dealers (

) can be written as:

(4-1)
where

is used in both equations because two prices are driven by the same implicit

efficient price (Hasbrouck (2002)). Since price levels are I(1) processes, first order
differences of price levels would be I(0) processes. According to the Wold Theorem, any
variance stationary time series can be represented in the moving average form. Thus the
moving average representation of

is given by:
(4-2)

where

reflect the innovations in the two groups, and

are two-by-two

matrices. This vector moving average (VMA) model can be simplified as the VECM
format:
(4-3)
where Pt=(P1t,P2t)’ is the two-group price series, α is the error correction vector, β is the
cointegrating vector, and et consists of innovations. This equation is an elegant
simplification of the VMA form and is easier to estimate. The first term on the right hand
side represents the long-run equilibrium dynamics, whereas the second term represents
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short-run frictions. The residuals term

is the innovations term in the quotes, which

comprises two vectors of serially uncorrelated disturbances.
To calculate the information share of each group over a particular period, we pick
estimated innovations

in the target period, which has two columns (corresponding to

two groups of price series), and calculate the covariance matrix of the innovations Ω:
(4-4)

where

and

are innovation variances from the two groups, and

is covariance of

innovations. Usually the covariance is not zero because there will always be some
correlation between the two price series. In our example, we have big dealer and small
dealer price series as the two groups, and there is hardly any justification that these two
series should be totally uncorrelated. To eliminate the contemporaneous correlations, we
employ a Choleski Decomposition on the covariance matrix:
Ω=MM’

(4-5)

where
Assuming that

, then the information shares of the two price series in the

target period are:
(4-6)

(4-7)
Notice that S1 and S2 sum to 1. Intuitively, they give both groups’ percentage
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contributions in the price discovery. If the theoretical hypothesis is true, informed (big)
dealers’ information share should decrease after the electronic trading system.
We use the same set of quote data and news data described before to conduct this
test. We look at quotes from each trading day (weekdays) and pick quotes (mid of bid-ask
prices) every five minutes from 8:00am to 20:00pm GMT daily. We pick these hours
because European and North American markets are open during these hours and they
usually have the most frequent trading activities and news releases on any given day.
Quotes are picked from the big and the small dealers groups respectively, where big
dealers are the top five dealers in terms of quoting frequencies for each month3.
Before we start the estimation, we conduct a Johansen cointegration test on the
big and small dealers’ quotes to confirm that they are cointegrated, with cointegrating
vector (1,-1), a condition for the method to work. The results are positive. Then,
following Sapp (2002), we use Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR), which takes into
account heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlations among innovations, to
estimate equation (4-3) to obtain each group’s efficient price innovation (

). The

optimal number of lags in the equation above is determined through Schwarz-Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC), and is found to be j=5.
Recall that the purpose of this section is to test whether informed dealers would
quote less aggressively and reveal less information in a more transparent market. Such a
pattern, if true, should be most significant when information asymmetry is most severe
(i.e. when big dealers have the most information advantages). Chen and Phylaktis (2009)
show that big banks have private information advantage especially after major news is
released. So we pick the period after major news release as our target period to test
3

Different thresholds will be tested later for robustness of the results.
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information share change before and after the EBS was introduced.
Again, following Almeida et al. (1998) and Anderson et al. (2007), we define
various US and German macroeconomic news as significant news releases, and Table 3
shows how many major news releases are included in our test. We focus on one hour
after each significant news release to calculate information share by using equations (4-3)
through (4-7). Note that we pick elements from vectors

that correspond to the hour

after each significant news release, so we obtain information share values for the hour
after each significant news release for each month. One hour window is picked because
any period shorter than that might not have enough observations to calculate reliable
information share 4 . Also, the one hour interval makes major news overlaps quite
insignificant, i.e. most significant news release times are more than one hour from each
other. This means that when calculating information shares, a certain quote will most
likely only belong to one news group.
We test the hypothesis that the information shares of big dealers calculated from
these quotes should be smaller after the system was introduced. The information shares
are computed for each news release. A simple paired t-test is conducted, and the results
are reported in Panel A of Table 4. Big dealers’ information share in the new system is
significantly lower than in the old opaque system at the 1% level. Figure 3 shows the
average information share of each month, with the vertical axis being the information
shares for big dealers for each month. The first 12 observations are before the electronic
systems were introduced and subsequent observations are after the new system.
Apparently, big dealers’ contribution to the efficient price decreases after the electronic
trading system.
4

We will test different window periods longer than 1 hour later to check the robustness of our results.
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In addition to major news releases, news arrival frequency is another indicator of
information asymmetry. As shown in Chen and Phylaktis (2009), big dealers’
information share increases as more news arrive the market. If big dealers quote less
aggressively in the electronic trading system, the increase of their information share
should decrease. Thus, we have the second specification below:

Information share in this test is calculated based on the quotes for each hour in every
trading day. News arrival frequency is also counted based on the corresponding hour.
The results are reported in Panel A of Table 6. The coefficient of news arrival is
found to be significantly positive, suggesting that big dealers do have more information
advantage and make higher contribution to the price discovery when more news arrives
to the market. Meanwhile, the significantly negative coefficient of interaction between
news arrival and system dummy says that the increase in price contribution has decreased
in the new trading system. This result, along with the result from the first information
share test, suggests that the dealers with information advantage do quote less aggressively
in the semi-transparent market, which supports the conclusions obtained in Flood et al.
(1999) and Madhavan (1995).

4.3 Robust Tests
In the information efficiency test in Section 4.1, although the results are
significant, it does not directly imply that the increase in information efficiency was
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exactly due to the new system introduced in 10/1993. The EBS dummy variable may
simply act as time dummy in an environment where information efficiency gradually
increased due to other reasons. To address this concern, we conduct a robustness test by
focusing on the months immediately before and after the system was introduced, and
performing the same test using data from these months. If this test also returns significant
results, it would indicate that the increasing information efficiency was indeed due to the
abrupt system change in 10/1993. Because the system change actually started in 09/1993,
we use data from 08/1993 and 11/1993 for this test. The results are reported in Panel B of
Table 2. Again, all coefficients have the same respective signs with those obtained from
the full sample test. The more negative coefficient for lagged return, combined with the
more positive coefficient for system dummy interacting with lagged return, implies that
even though price reversal is more severe when the sample covers months immediately
before and after the EBS was introduced, the system reduces exchange rate return
autocorrelation to a greater extent so as to bring it closer to zero (in fact, the net value 0.1035 is closer than -0.1201, the net value under the full test). In other words, the effect
is more apparent in this short term test. The same implication could be drawn from the
other pair of coefficients. Overall, we can conclude that the new system contributed to an
increase in information efficiency.
In Section 4.2, we found significant evidence that information shares of big
dealers decreased after the system was introduced. In fact, information share can be
affected by two factors. First, how much information advantage the dealer has (i.e. degree
of information asymmetry). Second, how much the dealer is willing to reveal her private
information through her quotes. The decrease of big dealers’ information share detected
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by our paper might also be caused by their loss in information advantage, thus the
decrease in information share does not necessarily mean that big dealers are not willing to
reveal this information in the semi-transparent market. To address this concern, we show
that big dealers did not lose their information advantage. The information advantage can
be measured by a popular metric in market microstructure literature -- the Probability of
Informed Trading (PIN). The PIN is calculated as the ratio of orders from informed
traders to the total number of orders. Unlike many applications of the PIN where dealer
IDs are unknown and the ratio needs to be estimated, we can explicitly identify informed
dealers (usually big dealers) in our data so that each big dealer’s PIN can be directly
approximated by their quote frequency over the total frequency. This ratio also reflects
the actual market share the dealer has. As suggested by FX market microstructure studies
such as Evans and Lyons (2002), private information is mainly conveyed through order
flow that dealers receive. Thus, intuitively, the bigger transaction volume and market
share the dealer has, the more information advantage the dealer has.
Table 5 lists the top 10 dealers for the months before and after 10/1993 with their
approximated market shares. It is evident from Table 5 that top banks before the EBS
continue to be top banks after the introduction of EBS. In addition, the variation of top 5
dealers’ monthly quotes ratios is shown in Figure 4. There is hardly any evidence that the
ratios have changed over this period. In fact, they seem to have gone up a little. Therefore,
Figure 4 and Table 5 together provide evidence that big dealers' composition and their
sheer quoting activities have not changed significantly. This implies that if the
information shares for big dealers decrease, it can only be the result of their intentional
hiding of information.
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In our original test, we define the top 5 banks as big dealers. Although this
definition is not totally arbitrary and has empirical rationale, it is somewhat subjective.
To test the robustness of our result with respect to this concern, we run the test again with
different definitions of big dealers -- the top 10 and top 20 banks as big dealers,
respectively. The results obtained from using the top 10 banks (reported in Table 4, Table
6 and Figure 5) are very similar to the previous results. The t-test (Table 4) returns a
significant, positive t-statistic, indicating that the monthly average information shares
after significant news releases were higher before the system was introduced. In addition,
the dummy coefficient, along with other coefficients, for the hourly information share test
(Table 6) have the same sign and comparable magnitudes with those obtained when
testing with top 5 banks as big dealers.
The results for the top 20 banks (see Table 4, 6 and Figure 6) are different in that
the dummy coefficient becomes positive, and so the information share values after the
system was introduced are bigger than those before. This is actually not surprising
because by switching from top 10 to top 20, we are adding a lot more banks and so the
information share values for this group of big banks should increase. Also, by including
more banks into our “big dealer” list, the distinction between the big dealers and small
dealers becomes less substantial, as does their behavior. These results show that as the
threshold for big dealers becomes lower, the effect diminishes, and even changes sign.
We conclude that we can see significant decrease in information share values, and thus
the intentional hiding of information, for dealers up to the top 10 banks.
In the original test, we calculate the information share for the interval of 1-hour
after major news release. The selection of 1-hour is also somewhat subjective. We test
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robustness of our results by using different window periods – 1.5 hour and 2 hours.
Results are reported in Table 4, 6 and Figure 7, 8. It is clear that the results are robust.
Using different window periods paints the same picture as before: significant positive
coefficient for news arrival, and significant negative coefficient for the interaction
variable. This provides strong empirical support that within a reasonable time period after
important news releases, big dealers do have information advantage, but they reveal less
of their insider information after the system made the market more transparent.

5. Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of introducing the EBS on the foreign exchange
market. The event transformed the market from being almost opaque to semi-transparent.
The paper tries to answer whether this change has affected the market efficiency and if so,
how different the effect is between informed (big) and uninformed (small) dealers. We
tested informational efficiency and price discovery efficiency in order to answer this
question.
The paper finds that semi-transparency brought by the new system leads to an
increase in information efficiency overall. However, informed dealers tend to reveal less
information in the more transparent market, thus contributing less towards the efficient
market prices. Several robustness tests are conducted, and the results agree with each
other and confirm our conclusions.
Prior to our study, the impact of electronic trading systems on the FX market had
not been studied extensively. Even now, further research is necessary in several key areas.
Although quoting frequency turns out to be a reliable proxy for volume in our tests, it is
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still not as accurate as actual volume data. It would consequently be valuable if future
studies retest our hypotheses with real volume data. With actual transaction data, future
research can also test how different dealers’ monetary welfare change after the new
system. Moreover, the current research is limited to the inter-dealer market, but it could
be extended to the customer FX market. Such research could, for example, focus on
internet trading, which is gaining popularity and changing the information structure in the
customer market.
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Table 1: Basic Statistics of Midquotes and 5-min Quote Frequency
Sample Size

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Min

Max

Midquotes

2622458

1.6613

0.0682

1.3895

1.7710

Quote
Frequency

93053

28.0338

24.8340

3

311
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Table 2: Exchange Rate Return Autocorrelation Test
This table reports the regression results of the equation:

Numbers above the parentheses are estimated coefficients and numbers in the parentheses
are the corresponding t-statistics. * indicates the coefficient is significant at 5%
significance level.

#obs

Lagged
Constant
return

Number
of Number
of
Lagged
quotes*lagged quotes*Lagged
return*dummy
return
return*dummy

Panel A: full sample
All
-0.0000
96417
dealer
(0)

-0.1951*
(-34.15)

0.0750*
(68.47)

0.0035*
(132.29)

-0.0031*
(-10.33)

Panel B: short term
All
0.0000
11725
dealer
(0)

-0.3056*
(-20.42)

0.2021*
(6.35)

0.0069*
(8.13)

-0.0066*
(-7.31)
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Table 3: Number of Significant News Releases in Each Month
Significant news are US and German macroeconomic news, including news related to
GDP, interest rates, inflation, unemployment, income and spending, retail sales, durable
goods sales, consumption, industrial production. The news data we use come from
Reuters AAMM headline news.
month

92/10

92/11

92/12

93/01

93/02

93/03

93/04

93/05

93/06

frequency 57

56

36

62

43

61

61

62

105

month

93/08

93/09

93/11

93/12

94/01

94/02

94/03

94/04

41

74

97

128

155

108

154

163

93/07

frequency 57
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Table 4: T-Test Results
Top 5 dealers for every month in terms of the number of quotes given; same definition
applies to other top dealers. * indicates the coefficient is significant at 5% significance
level.
t-statistics

Sample
Size

Implications of the results

Panel A: different threshold for big dealers
Top 5 Dealers

16.8966*

834

The information shares after 93/10
are smaller

Top 10 Dealers

14.7921*

836

The information shares after 93/10
are smaller

Top 20 Dealers

-24.7063*

837

The information shares after 93/10
are bigger

Panel B: different horizon for information share
1.5 hours Window
Period
(top
5 19.0277 *
834
dealers)
2 hours Window
Period
(top
5 19.1851 *
834
dealers)

The information shares after 93/10
are smaller
The information shares after 93/10
are smaller
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Table 5: Dealers ranking with quote frequency ratio
This table lists top 10 dealers based on monthly quote frequency. The corresponding
ratios are each dealer’s quote frequency over total quote frequency, used as proxy for
market share and PIN.
Banks
04/1993
Deutsche Bank
BHF Bank
Credit Suisse
Chemical Bank
Societe Generale
Rabobank Nederland
Lloyds Bank
Dresdner Bank
Credit Lyonnais
Amsterdam-Rotterdam
07/1993
Deutsche Bank-Asia
BHF BANK
Credit Suisse
Chemical Bank
Rabobank Nederland
Lloyds Bank
Credito Italiano
Amsterdam-Rotterdam
Societe Generale
Dresdner Bank
11/1993
CFCIC-UE
DEUTSCHE Bank
SOC GENERALE
BHF Bank
Rabobank
Credit Suisse
Barclays
Raiffeisen Zentralbank
VUW Bank
Chemical bank
02/1994
DEUTSCHE BK
RABOBANK
CFCIC-UE
SOC GENERALE
Barclays
CREDITO
LLOYDS BANK
RZB
UBS
Chemical bank

Ratios
0.0772
0.0647
0.0589
0.049
0.0466
0.0409
0.04
0.0265
0.0229
0.0222
0.0801
0.0662
0.0536
0.0411
0.0371
0.0353
0.0323
0.0283
0.0276
0.0254
0.0928
0.0754
0.0659
0.0612
0.051
0.0389
0.027
0.0239
0.0233
0.0226
0.1211
0.0739
0.0618
0.0605
0.0385
0.0305
0.0292
0.0247
0.0232
0.0226

Banks
05/1993
Deutsche Bank
Credit Suisse
Societe Generale
Chemical Bank
BHF Bank
Rabobank Nederland
Lloyds Bank
Amsterdam-Rotterdam
Barclays Bank
Dresdner Bank
08/1993
Deutsche Bank-Asia
BHF BANK
Rabobank Nederland
Credit Suisse
Chemical Bank
Lloyds Bank
Societe Generale
Credito Italiano
Citibank
Dresdner Bank
12/1993
DEUTSCHE Bank
CFCIC-UE
SOC GENERALE
Rabobank
Barclays
BHF Bank
Credit Suisse
LLOYDS BANK
DEN NORSKE
UBS
03/1994
DEUTSCHE BK
CFCIC-UE
SOC GENERALE
RABOBANK
CREDITO
UBS
Barclays
RZB
CITIBANK
LLOYDS BANK

Ratios
0.0773
0.0534
0.0448
0.0444
0.0436
0.0367
0.0359
0.0355
0.0268
0.0264
0.0729
0.0572
0.0515
0.0461
0.0442
0.0384
0.0379
0.0316
0.0266
0.0236
0.1159
0.087
0.0826
0.0747
0.0465
0.0344
0.0343
0.0289
0.0215
0.0214
0.1002
0.0892
0.0753
0.0668
0.0313
0.0302
0.0276
0.0251
0.0239
0.023

Banks
06/1993
Deutsche Bank
Chemical Bank
Credit Suisse
Societe Generale
BHF BANK
Lloyds Bank
Rabobank Nederland
Amsterdam-Rotterdam
Citibank
Den Danske Bank
09/1993
Deutsche Bank
Banque de l Union
BHF BANK
Rabobank Nederland
Societe Generale
Credit Suisse
Lloyds Bank
Chemical Bank
Dresdner Bank
Den Norske Bank
01/1994
CFCIC-UE
DEUTSCHE BK
RABOBANK
SOC GENERALE
Credit Suisse
Barclays
CREDITO
BHF Bank
LLOYDS BANK
UBS
04/1994
CFCIC-UE
RABOBANK
SOC GENERALE
DEUTSCHE BK
RZB
ABN AMRO
Barclays
CITIBANK
CREDITO
BHF Bank

Ratios
0.0794
0.0463
0.0449
0.0419
0.0416
0.0386
0.0386
0.0311
0.0272
0.0237
0.0733
0.0653
0.0595
0.0527
0.049
0.0475
0.0433
0.031
0.0289
0.0259
0.0923
0.077
0.0743
0.0737
0.0586
0.0312
0.0294
0.0275
0.0237
0.0217
0.1336
0.1049
0.0448
0.0352
0.0344
0.0309
0.0297
0.027
0.0235
0.0231

30

Table 6: Information Shares Versus News Arrival
This

table

reports

the

regression

results

of

equation
Numbers above the parentheses are estimated coefficients and numbers in the
parentheses are the corresponding t-statistics. Top 5 dealers every month in terms of
the number of quotes given; same definition applies to other top dealers. * indicates
the coefficient is significant at 5% significance level.
#obs

Constant

News arrival

News arrival *
R-squared
system dummy

Top 5 dealers

3096

0.5396*
(121.00)

0.0014*
(7.19)

-0.0016*
(-14.66)

0.0652

Top 10 dealers

3096

0.5140*
(195.84)

0.0009*
(7.91)

-0.0012*
(-18.58)

0.1021

Top 20 dealers

3096

0.4761*
(136.90)

-0.0010*
(-6.94)

0.0020*
(23.77)

0.1657

0.5578*
(157.79)

0.0005*
(4.39)

-0.0011*
(-12.56)

0.0736

0.5330*
(70.87)

0.0010*
(6.39)

-0.0009*
(-12.07)

0.1021

Panel A:

Panel B:
1.5
hours
Window
2065
Period (top 5
dealers)
2
hours
Window
1549
Period (top 5
dealers)

Figure 1: Midquote, Variance and Quote Frequency

Figure 2: Daily News Arrival Frequency

Figure 3: Big Dealers (top 5) Information Shares
(1 Hour After News)

Figure 4: Big Dealers (top 5) Quote Ratios

Figure 5: Big Dealers (top 10) Information Shares
(1 Hour After News)

Figure 6: Big Dealers (top 20) Information Shares
(1 Hour After News)

Figure 7: Big Dealers (top 5) Information Shares
(1.5 Hour After News)

Figure 8: Big Dealers (top 5) Information Shares
(2 Hour After News)

